STATEMENT

by H.E. Ambassador Anders Rönquist
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on the occasion of the
Concluding Session of the High Level Review of UN Sanctions

United Nations

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Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen.

By virtue of Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council wields one of its most persuasive instruments. Sanctions can deter non-constitutional changes, constrain terrorism, promote nuclear non-proliferation, defend human rights and support peaceful transitions. In almost all of the 25 cases where sanctions have been used by the UN, they have been part of an overarching strategy featuring peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding elements.

We know that sanctions can work — when they are designed and implemented well and when they enjoy the support of Member States on and outside the Security Council.

Sweden's support and participation in the High Level Review stems from a long and active engagement, including with the issues regarding challenges of implementation. In a wish to utilize its experiences from sitting on the Security Council in the years 1997-1998 Sweden took the lead in the year-long Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. It was the third step in a series of attempts to reform the sanctions instrument and took a very broad perspective. Some of what was recognized in the report from the Stockholm process - the need for coordination in and between the UN and other relevant actors – is still very relevant.

In the High Level Review, members, together with the UN Secretariat in the form of the Department for Political Affairs and the Interagency Working Group on UN sanctions looked at possible further improvements. Let me take this opportunity to extend my Government's and my sincere appreciation for their contributions to this Compendium.

Sweden chaired Working Group II of the Review.

Working Group II focused on issues in three specific areas; International Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Export Controls; Financial Controls; and International Criminal Justice. These three subfields represent significant albeit very different subject-matters where various types of controls or actions decided by other bodies operate simultaneously with UN sanctions.

Perhaps surprising, given the diverse nature of the topics, there are several findings that are common to all or at least two of the three areas discussed and I will focus on them. For the findings relevant to one or other of the specific areas I would refer to the Compendium.

Firstly, to enhance opportunities for cooperation among UN sanctions actors and related international organizations and arrangements through strategic partnerships and specific technical arrangements. Building on the successful experiences with i.e. INTERPOL and its programs or the flight information arrangement called Europol, such partnerships could create opportunities to build up the necessary expertise and information within the UN.

Secondly, to break down existing "stovepipes" of information and discussion both within the UN and between the UN and related organizations and institutions. The welcomed creation of the UN Interagency Working Group on Sanctions, formed to provide inputs into the High Level Review, is in itself testimony to this phenomenon, which is not unexpected in such a large and complex organization as the United Nations. One of the suggestions emerging from the Working Group was to break down barriers between related functional bodies and
come together under general topical umbrellas, such as ‘non-proliferation’ so as to realize greater synergies.

Thirdly, to promote awareness-raising, interaction, and communication at all levels of the sanctions implementation chain. Effective implementation of UN sanctions requires understanding and cooperation of relevant actors at all levels – within the UN system, with related international organizations, among regional organizations as well as Member States and their private sectors. Regular interaction between those designing UN sanctions and those responsible for carrying out the measures at the national level is particularly important and should be recognized.

Fourthly, to prepare and disseminate practical sanctions implementation guidance useful to Member States in carrying out their obligations. The need for more information regarding sanctions is apparent and widespread. Several of the sanctions committees have developed factsheets and other forms of implementation guidance. It should be standardized and generalized as far as possible and have a clear UN identity.

Fifthly, to develop and to use clear standardized definitions in UNSC resolutions of commonly used sanctions terms for improved legal certainty and more harmonized implementation. Language matters, and greater clarity and consistency of terminology and expression of obligations in sanctions resolutions are needed. Precision is necessary also in Sanctions Committees’ guidance for implementing sanctions at the national level.

Sixthly, to develop sanctions-specific capacity building assistance. Counter-terrorism and non-proliferation capacity assistance has received broad support, but assistance focused on UN sanctions implementation more generally has not been as readily accessible. Countries with weaker administrative capabilities in particular require specialized sanctions assistance.

I hope that these findings, as well as many of the others in the Compendium, will be taken forward. I would be very interested in hearing participants’ views on how this could best be done.

In concluding, I should simply repeat that my own country is very seriously committed to more effective, efficient and contemporary sanctions regimes within the UN. We will work diligently with all other members of the project and with Member States to achieve this.

Thank you.